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Abstract
This paper presents the first cross-country empirical evidence on the determinants of par-
ticipation in Fairtrade and the impact of the export of Fairtrade certified products on
agricultural growth in low and middle income countries. Using the number of certified
producer organizations per country in 2006-2010 as a proxy for Fairtrade exports, esti-
mation results indicate a small but significantly positive effect on the growth rate of per
capita value added in agriculture that is largest in upper middle income countries. Given
the particularly poverty-reducing effect of agricultural growth, we find empirical evidence
that Fairtrade certification is indeed able to deliver its core values, but misses to target
the very poor.
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1 Introduction
Being a consumer concerned with sustainable consumption, the purchase of Fairtrade (FT)
certified products seems to be one possibility to support marginalized producers in the global
South.1,2 The FT model offers farmers and agricultural workers in the South higher prices, a
per unit FT premium, stable market links, and assistance in finance and development, while
consumers in the North are able to satisfy their need for socially and ecologically responsible
consumption (Raynolds, 2000; Becchetti and Rosati, 2005; Granville, 2009).
Since the early 2000s the Fair Trade movement became increasingly popular among con-
sumers as an alternative form of socially regulated trade (Raynolds, 2012). According to
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), FT sales increased in 2003-2010 from
830 million to 4.9 billion Euro, corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 25 percent.
The four largest products by value, coffee, bananas, cocoa and flowers, generated more than
80 percent of FT sales. In 2010, 905 certified producer organizations represented 1.15 million
farmers in 63 developing countries. The FT premium paid to producer cooperatives amounted
to 51.5 million Euro (54 Euro on average per member/worker) and was spent, e.g. on business
development, production and quality improvements, cash payments to members, educational
and environmental programs (Kilpatrick, 2011).
The World Bank (2008) emphasizes in the World Development Report Agriculture for De-
velopment the importance of agriculture for development and poverty reduction. The main
pathways out of poverty include improvements in productivity, profitability and sustainability
of smallholder farming in developing countries by, among others, enhancing access to finan-
cial services and reducing risk exposure, advancing producer organizations’ performance, and
providing environmental services.
Positive effects of FT on marginalized producers have been emphasized in FT reports
(Krier, 2008; Smith, 2009; Boonman et al., 2011; Kilpatrick, 2011) and several case studies.
Participation in FT coffee trade networks reduces producers’ exposure and thereby vulnera-
bility to low coffee prices, significantly raises income, reduces the dropout rate from school,
and increases the probability of treatment in the case of illness (Bacon, 2005; Arnould et al.,
2009). Certification also creates advantages through access to credit and cooperative services.
FT cooperative membership can be seen as institutional surrogate providing marginalized
farmers with conditions for the development of contractual arrangements necessary to export
and hedge against price volatility (Berndt, 2007; Valkila, 2009).
However, the question whether the purchase of FT certified products indeed supports
marginalized producers is a disputed topic. Critics raise three main issues: i) inefficiency
of the transfer, i.e., only a small fraction of the higher price paid by consumers reaches the
1 We follow the distinction of Northern and Southern countries as this seems to be standard in the literature.
Northern countries are consumer countries (Europe, USA, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand),
Southern countries comprise all developing countries that supply, or are eligible to supply, Fair Trade products
(Boonman et al., 2011; FLO, 2011).
2 “Fairtrade” exclusively refers to the certification schemes of Fairtrade Labelling Organization International
(FLO), while “Fair Trade” refers to World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) certification (WFTO and FLO,
2011). For simplicity we use “Fair Trade” as a general umbrella term, when we refer to the concept of equal
exchange in general.
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producers in the South, ii) distortion of markets due to a price floor, iii) lock in effect in
unproductive activities (Yanchus and de Vanssay, 2003; Mann, 2008; Sidwell, 2008).
The efficacy of participating in FT has not yet been tested in a cross-country setting,
only in case studies built on qualitative interviews (Witkowski, 2005). Notwithstanding,
these studies give important insights into the micro-level consequences of FT certification,
but their results can not be generalized due to omitted country specific factors. The main
contribution of this paper is thus to provide a causal cross-country analysis that i) sheds light
on the determinants of smallholders’ participation in FT on a country-level, and ii) allows to
analyze the impact of FT certification on growth in the agricultural sector. In a first step we
collect data on the number of FT certified producer organizations per country and analyze the
determinants of participation in FT and the extent of certification employing a zero-inflated
negative binomial (ZINB) model. In a next step we set up a model inspired by an “aid-growth”
framework where use the number of producer organizations to proxy the share of FT exports
in order to identify a possible causal effect of FT on agricultural growth (Collier and Dollar,
2002; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Christiaensen et al., 2011).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the
literature on the system and the effects of FT certification, and the relevance of agriculture for
development. Section 3 sets up the ZINB model, describes the data and presents results on
the determinants of participation in FT and its extent. Section 4 formalizes a growth model
that accounts for FT certification, presents estimation results and provides robustness checks.
The final section 5 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Literature Review
2.1 A brief history of Fair Trade
The Fair Trade idea is rooted in the cooperative movement in 19th century Italy and UK, and
was revived by religious and political movements promoting alternative trade in the UK and
US in the 1950s and 1960s. International development agencies and religious organizations
started to assist Southern producers in production and export to reduce unequal exchange
and poverty (Low and Davenport, 2005; Gendron et al., 2009; Boonman et al., 2011).3
Until the late 1980s, mainly products from the craft sector were sold in World Shops or by
specialized retailers.4 The recession-driven decline in demand in the global North in the early
1980s, a lack of marketing strategies and increasing competition lead to a drop in Fair Trade
craft sales (Tallontire, 2000; Low and Davenport, 2005). At the same time falling coffee prices,
triggered by the dismantling of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989, required new
income strategies for marginalized farmers. In this context, the Dutch development agency
Solidaridad introduced the first Fair Trade label “Max Havelaar” to gain access to mainstream
distribution channels. The idea spread rapidly across Europe and North America, resulting
3 For a summary of the history of the FT see Tallontire (2000); Fridell (2004) and Low and Davenport (2005).
4 World Shops are specialized on Fair Trade products, and until the 1990s mostly run by volunteers. These
“not for profit” organizations (Krier, 2008, p.27) sell Fair Trade products, and organize informative and
educational activities.
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in the foundation of certification agencies in 19 countries. In 1997, these country-initiatives
established the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO) in Bonn, Germany,
to unite the labelling initiatives under one umbrella organization and to establish common
certification standards. Since then Fair Trade has grown from a response to declining coffee
prices to a certification system covering a wide range of agricultural products, ensuring social
and ecological standards of production (Low and Davenport, 2005; Steinrücken and Jaenichen,
2007; Valkila, 2009).
2.2 Fair Trade principles
According to the official definition, “Fair Trade (or “Fairtrade”) is, fundamentally, a response
to the failure of conventional trade to deliver sustainable livelihoods and development op-
portunities to the people in the poorest countries of the world; this is evidenced by the two
billion of our fellow citizens who, despite working extremely hard, survive on less than $2 per
day”(WFTO and FLO, 2009, p.5).
The core principles of Fair Trade are market access for marginalized producers, sustainable
and equitable trading relationships, capacity building and empowerment, consumer awareness
raising and advocacy, the perception of FT as a “‘social contract”, and adherence to the stan-
dards of the International Labour Organization (ILO) (WFTO and FLO, 2009). The two
major certification organizations advocating these principles are the World Fair Trade Or-
ganization (WFTO, formerly IFAT) and the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International
(FLO). The former certifies handicraft and artisan goods, the latter focuses on commodity
crops as coffee or bananas, but also high-value agricultural products as flowers (Leclair, 2002;
Boonman et al., 2011). In the empirical section of this paper we concentrate on FLO-certified
goods, i.e. we consider only agricultural products.
Producers, eligible for FLO certification, must be organized democratically in small pro-
ducer organizations, contract production schemes or hired labor organizations (e.g. for flowers
or bananas, which are usually grown on large farms and require permanent harvesting). The
size of the FT producer organizations varies considerably, with the smallest comprising around
10 members, and the largest more than 70,000. 50 percent of all producer organizations have
less than 300 members. Nine out of the ten largest producer organizations can be found in
Africa, where the largest share of FT-labor is employed (Kilpatrick, 2011).
The FLO (2007b) guarantees certified producer organizations a floor price (FT minimum
price) plus a price premium per unit sold to a FT customer. If the market price exceeds the
minimum price, then the market price plus the price premium applies (see Figure A1 in the
Appendix). Up to 60 percent of the purchase price should be pre-financed to the producer
organizations, serving as pre-export lines of credit.5
FT premium income is intended for collective use by producer organizations and lim-
ited to socio-economic purposes at the community or cooperative level, such as investment in
organizational development, production and processing, loans for individual/family needs, ed-
5 Price setting differs slightly across products, but follows basically the scheme illustrated in Figure A1. For
details concerning the FLO certification process for different types of producers, please see FLO (2013).
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ucational and environmental projects, communal infrastructure, health facilities and women’s
programs. In 2010, the average FT premium received per producer organization was 80,000
Euro (54 Euro per member/worker), and around 60 percent of total premium income were
allocated to banana and coffee producers.
It should be emphasized that successful certification is driven by demand. A supplier can
obtain FT certification only if she obtained a letter of intent from a wholesaler or retailer
to purchase her product at the FT price. On average, only 30 percent of a cooperative’s
production are sold to FT markets, while the rest goes to conventional markets (Bacon, 2005;
Booth and Whetstone, 2007; Mann, 2008).
2.3 Pro and contra Fair Trade
Coffee was the first commodity traded under the FT label, thereby initiating FT standards
for agricultural products, and shows the highest market share of FT relative to conventional
production (Raynolds, 2009).6 It is one of the few internationally traded commodities that is
produced mainly by small-scale farmers (Utting-Chamorro, 2005). Consequently, the majority
of (empirical) studies analyzes coffee farmers in Latin and Middle America.7
Bacon (2005) investigates a sample of 228 small-scale coffee producers in northern Nicaragua
in a livelihood vulnerability framework. Participation in alternative coffee trade networks
(FT, organic, direct to roaster) is able to reduce exposure and vulnerability to low coffee
prices, even if many FT certified cooperatives sell up to 70 percent of the harvest to con-
ventional markets. In a follow-up study, Bacon et al. (2008) find that in households selling
to FT markets, children show higher primary school attendance rates and women work more
days on coffee farms. Also, more water purification systems and soil and water conservation
practices were installed. On average, six days more of technical assistance, easier access to
pre-harvest credit and better contact to development programs of non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), including scholarships, education, coffee quality training, and micro credit
programs were reported.
More formally, Arnould et al. (2009), using survey data for Nicaragua, Guatemala and
Peru, compare socioeconomic indicators as educational attainment, health status and income
of FT and conventional coffee producing households.8 Results from a sample of 1,269 of FT
and comparable non-FT coffee farmers in 2004-2005 indicate a significant increase in income,
a reduction in the dropout rate from school, and an increase in the probability of receiving
treatment in the case of illness for the FT households.
A more critical perspective is drawn by Valkila (2009) who compares conventional, FT
and organic FT coffee producers in Nicaragua in 2005-2008. Even under low-intensity organic
6 The Dutch organization Fair Trade Organisatie (FTO) started importing FT coffee from Guatemala in 1973
(Gendron et al., 2009).
7 See Nelson and Pound (2009) for a literature review and a meta-study on the impact of FT certification on
coffee farmers.
8 The coffee producers in the study are certified from Fair Trade USA, who resigned from the FLO standards
in 2011 in favor of a more ‘market-oriented’ US certification agency applying a less strict certification regime.
Under the Fair Trade USA regime, a ten percent share is sufficient to qualify for the FT label, and compliance
to ILO standards was dispensed on behalf of large plantations (Raynolds, 2012; FLO, 2012).
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farming, FT certification increases income when the market price is below the FT price floor,
but during high-price periods FT farmers are restricted to lower income due to lower output
relative to conventional production. However, the interviewees appreciate the stable prices and
the resulting reduction in income fluctuations, and are aware of possible harmful consequences
of inorganic fertilizers to health and environment.
FT certification enhances cooperation with NGOs, who assist farmers in the certification
process by providing training and finance, and encourages the formation of producer cooper-
atives. Cooperative membership creates opportunities by pooling resources, access to credit
and development projects, and strengthens producers’ positions in negotiations with suppliers
or the local administration. The economic, social and ecological aspects of FT promote local
and regional rural development, which in turn is expected to reduce poverty (Bacon et al.,
2008; Valkila, 2009; Wilson, 2010; Center for Evaluation, 2012).
In contrast to the (empirical) micro-level studies, a theoretical analysis reveals a disequi-
librium: Firstly, asking for an above-market price without delivering extra (physical) product
quality will cause oversupply and a welfare loss. The price floor enables inefficient produc-
ers to stay in the market even if marginal costs exceed marginal revenue at world market
prices (Mann, 2008). The FLO responds to the problem of potential oversupply by demand-
induced producer registration, such that the finalization of certification depends on demand
of importers (Booth and Whetstone, 2007).
Secondly, a transfer in the form of a price floor and a price premium is inefficient relative
to a direct transfer. Anecdotal evidence for coffee says that only 10 percent of the higher
price paid by consumers reaches the producers. Besides causing price distortions, consumers
not only pay a higher price, but also carry the costs from a suboptimal level of aggregate
production, caused by oversupply of FT commodities (Yanchus and de Vanssay, 2003; The
Economist, 2007; Sidwell, 2008; Lindsey, 2004).
Thirdly, in a specific factors model where land is specific to agricultural production, an in-
crease in the return to FT certified factors will lead to a decrease in the return to non-certified
factors, as all producers compete for limited resources as water or electricity (Yanchus and
de Vanssay, 2003). More general, Sidwell (2008) criticizes the FT model for assuming that
poor farmers must always remain farmers. Rewarding inefficient producers for unproductive
activities reduces the incentives to diversify and modernize, creating a poverty trap for small-
holders. Finally, those who cannot apply for FT certification, i.e. landless people, and those
who are not able to meet the standards, i.e. the very poor and unskilled, are excluded from
FT by its very construction.
2.4 Agriculture and development
According to the World Bank (2008) World Development Report Agriculture for Develop-
ment, three out of four poor people in developing countries live in rural areas, most of those
two billion people depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. On average, growth in the
agricultural sector turned out at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as growth in the
rest of the economy. The impact of agriculture on poverty is thus on average larger than its
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share in the economy as a whole. Moreover, agricultural growth is a precondition to broader,
economy-wide growth (Bresciani and Valdés, 2007; Bezemer and Headey, 2008; World Bank,
2008; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2009; Christiaensen et al., 2011).
Agricultural growth affects poverty via i) enhancing the labor market (employment and
wage effects), ii) increasing smallholders’ incomes (plus indirect income effects through growth
multipliers), and iii) by affecting real food prices. Concerning the first channel, if agriculture
uses unskilled labor intensively, and given integrated rural and urban labor markets, then
agricultural growth can increase wages in rural and urban areas and thereby reduce poverty.
Growth based on high value-added crops with robust forward linkages facilitates these labor
market effects. When a large share of the population is self-employed in agriculture, the second
channel via small-farm income growth and resulting multiplier effects are powerful factors in
poverty reduction. The effect of decreasing food-prices on rural (and urban) poor, in turn,
will only exhibit poverty-reducing effects if agricultural growth has permanent effects on food
prices. In small open economies, however, food prices are mostly determined by movements
of the real exchange rate (Bresciani and Valdés, 2007).
To what extent does the concept of FT meet the requirements for effective poverty re-
duction? FT sales grew on average by 25 percent per year, but the small size of the FT
sector relative to conventional agriculture makes any significant effect on the labor market
and overall economic growth hardly measurable on a country-level. Also, as FT cooperative
membership is restricted to smallholders, employment possibilities of unskilled labor are lim-
ited to harvest hands, with wages set by national minimum requirements. Nevertheless it has
been shown that the FT minimum price and the price premium indeed increase smallholders’
incomes and reduce uncertainty from price volatility (Bacon, 2005; Bacon et al., 2008; Arnould
et al., 2009). Finally, effects of FT certification via the food-price channel are unlikely as FT
certified goods, usually high-value crops produced for the export market, are (usually) not
required to meet nutritional needs of rural (and urban) poor.9 Altogether, if we are able to
observe any positive effect of FT certification on poverty, we expect it to arise via the second
channel by increasing smallholders’ incomes.
Poor rural households need to connect to (trade-induced) economic growth, which is more
easy if the source of growth is locally close (Christiaensen et al., 2011). With respect to the
heterogeneity among (rural) poor in their net trading positions, the World Bank (2008) con-
siders market oriented smallholder farming as the most effective strategy to connect small-
holders to economic growth and to reduce poverty. A more pro-poor design of agriculture
includes decentralized development projects and increased access to markets, public goods,
and institutions for an effective use of the available assets, as well as environmental protection
and hedging possibilities against climate shocks. Smallholder participation can be enhanced
by technical assistance and collective action through producer organizations (de Janvry and
Sadoulet, 2000; World Bank, 2008). Collective action from producer organizations can help to
correct market imperfections, such as high transaction costs or missing credit markets. They
9 Considering the heterogeneity among (rural) poor in their net trading positions (net consumers/producers
of food), Christiaensen et al. (2011) emphasize that conventional poverty and inequality measures do not
necessarily reveal the actual impact of changing food prices on the poor.
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help obtaining necessary information, to reach quality standards or to pool labor and financial
resources in order to sell to new domestic or international markets (Markelova et al., 2009).
Private outside assistance is often required for producer organizations to operate successfully
- such as the FT network. It combines local producer action with outside assistance that
provides access to high-value export markets in exchange for a certification fee.
From the literature survey we expect that FT certification on average increases partici-
pants’ incomes via the FT minimum price and related cooperative services, such as technical
assistance in production and marketing or access to education and medical treatment. To iso-
late the effect of FT certification on growth in the agricultural sector, we first need to identify
the determinants of the extensive and intensive margin of FT certification across countries.
If we are able to observe a positive effect of FT certification on agricultural growth, we al-
lege, ceteris paribus, that FT reduces rural poverty, since growth originating in agriculture is
considered particularly poverty-reducing.
3 Determinants of participation in Fairtrade
3.1 Empirical Model
According to the FLO (2011), producers from 143 countries with low or medium develop-
ment are eligible to apply for FT certification. Table A1 in the Appendix lists the countries
approved.10 When we look at Table A1 the question arises, why, e.g. South Africa has 45
FT certified producer organizations (FTPOs) or Zimbabwe 8, while neighboring Namibia and
Botswana do not have any?
We are interested in identifying the determinants of the number of FTPOs
FTPOi,t = x′i,tβ + z′i,t−1δ + ηr + ξt + εi,t. (1)
where x′i,t and z′i,t−1 explanatory variables that are likely to affect the number of FTPOs,
ηr are regional and ξt time fixed effects, εi,t a random error term. Equation (1) implicitly
contains the determinants of participation and the extent of FT certification. We assume
that these two questions are based on different processes, where participation might hinge on
geographical circumstances facilitating horticulture, while the count outcome may depend on
the economic and institutional environment.
The standard choice to model a two-stage problem with count data and a non-negligible
share of zeros (80 out of 143 eligible countries) is the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB)
model, a modification of the (zero inflated) Poisson model that allows for overdispersion. The
two parts of the model are a binary model that predicts the probability of belonging to the
group without FTPOs and a negative binomial model that gives the determinants of the event
count conditional on the predicted outcome of the participation decision. The expected count
is expressed as a combination of the two processes (Burger et al., 2009; Greene, 2009).
10Please note that this list also includes high-income countries such as Argentina or Saudi Arabia. For consis-
tency, we nevertheless stick in our analysis to the geographical scope defined by the FLO (2011).
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The ZINB model assumes that some of the zero counts are produced by a different data
generating process than the remaining counts, including some of the “other” zeros. While, e.g.,
the zero FTPO-count in Mongolia is likely to be driven by unfavorable climate conditions for
horticulture, the non-existence of FTPOs in Myanmar is probably related to years of political
and economic isolation. The model is able to distinguish between these two latent groups
in the sample, where one has strict zero count (Mongolia), while the other has a non-zero
probability of positive counts (Myanmar) (Burger et al., 2009). The two processes generating
a zero or a positive count are given by
Pr(yi,t = 0|xi,t, zi,t−1) = ψi,t + (1− ψi,t)
(
α−1
α−1 + µi,t
)α−1
Pr(yi,t|xi,t, zi,t−1) = (1− ψi,t)Γ(yi,t+α
−1)
yi,t!Γ(α−1)
(
α−1
α−1+µi,t
)α−1(
µi,t
α−1+µi,t
)yi,t
, yi,t = 1, 2, . . .
(2)
with µi,t = exp(x′i,tβ+z′i,t−1δ+ηr+ξt). The proportion of zeros ψi,t = F (−µi,t) is added to the
distribution of yi,t and the other frequencies are reduced by the corresponding amount, leading
to a finite mixture with a degenerate distribution whose mass is concentrated at zero (Long,
1997; Cameron and Trivedi, 2007). We parameterize ψi,t with a probit transformation such
that ψi,t = Φ(−µi,t) follows a standard normal distribution. Finally, the joint log likelihood
function is given by
lnL =
m∑
t=1
(
n∑
i=1
1(yi,t = 0) ln(ψi,t) + (1− ψi,t))
(
α−1
α−1 + µi,t
)α−1
)+
n∑
i=1
(1− 1(yi,t = 0)) ln((1− ψi,t) + ln Γ(α−1 + yi,t)−
ln Γ(yi,t + 1)− ln Γ(α−1) + α−1
(
ln α
−1
α−1 + µi
)α−1
+ yi,t ln
(
µi,t
α−1 + µi,t
)α−1
).
(3)
The ZINB model resembles a Heckman (1979) selection model, which corrects for the proba-
bility of FT certification in the outcome equation, but there are conceptual and differences:
A two-part model as the ZINB assumes conditional independence of the selection equation
and the count outcome (Burger et al., 2009). Following Puhani (2000), a low correlation be-
tween the error terms of the selection and the outcome equation is an indicator of conditional
independence. In our case, we observe ρ = 0.03 using probit estimation for the participation
decision and OLS estimation for the outcome. Although not fully comparable, results using
the log-normal Heckman selection model point to an insignificant inverse Mills ratio and sup-
port the assumption of conditional independence. Moreover, a two-part model is designed
to predict actual outcomes rather than potential outcomes (Madden, 2008). Since we ob-
serve all FT certified producer cooperatives across countries, we are interested in the actual
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determinants of the extent of FT certification.
Besides conceptual differences, also practical issues exist: The Heckman (1979) model
requires exogenous exclusion restrictions for the selection process to avoid collinearity of the
regressors and the inverse Mills ratio in the outcome equation. As for instrumental variables
it is usually rather troublesome to identify variables that affect only the participation decision
but not the outcome. Furthermore, the two-part model is less restrictive as it does not place
distributional assumptions on the error term (Leung and Yu, 1996; Madden, 2008; Cameron
and Trivedi, 2009). Both, the conceptual reasoning and the stringent assumptions of the
Heckman model, support the application of the ZINB model.
3.2 Data and Variables
The number of FTPOs per country and year is regressed on a set of time-varying lagged ex-
planatory variables (to avoid contemporaneous feedback effects), time-varying predetermined,
and exogenous time-invariant explanatory variables. Data on the number of FTPOs for the
years 2006, 2007 and 2010 is taken from FLO reports11, missing values for 2008 and 2009 were
imputed by calculating the country-specific growth rate of FTPO from 2007 to 2010 (rounded
off to whole numbers). The FLO does not report production or employment figures of FTPOs
on a country-level, compelling us to use this very general proxy of FT certified exports.
Eligible product categories for certification are cane sugar, cereals, cocoa, coffee, fibre
crops, flowers and plants, fresh fruit, herbs and herbal teas and spices, honey, nuts, oilseeds and
oleaginous fruits, prepared and preserves fruits and vegetables, sport balls, tea and vegetables
(Krier, 2008; Kilpatrick, 2011). By 2010, the largest number of certified producer organizations
can be found in Latin America (509 out of 905), but 60 percent of smallholders and workers
are employed in African FTPOs. The average annual growth rate of the number of producer
organizations is 25 percent, and only in 11 countries the number of FTPOs declined.12
We control for agricultural and geographic characteristics, assuming that the share of
arable land in total land area and country size in terms of population positively affect both,
the probability of having and the number of FT producers. Rural population density (rural
population divided by arable land in square kilometers) proxies the number of smallholders
and thus labor productivity (capital intensity) of the agricultural sector, where higher rural
population density corresponds to lower capital intensity. Similarly, the share of arable land
in total land area also indicates to some extent labor (capital) intensity of the agricultural
sector, but might reflect also geographical characteristics (desert, alpine areas), the import
penetration of the agricultural sector or the degree of urbanization (FAO, 2007). We include
both measures to control for a country’s agricultural diversity or specialization patterns, e.g.
the dualistic agricultural sector in Brazil, where we simultaneously observe capital and labor
intensive agricultural subsectors (Lindsey, 2004; Poulton et al., 2010).
11FLO (2007a,b); Kilpatrick (2011).
12Countries with a declining FTPOs: Guatemala (2006:23, 2010:22), El Salvador (2006:6, 2010:5), Haiti (2006:9,
2010:7), Lao PDR (2007:3, 2010:2), Mexico (2006:51, 2010:47), Nepal (2006:1, 2010:0), Rwanda (2006:10,
2010:8), Thailand (2006:9, 2010:7), Timor-Leste (2006:1, 2010:0), Uganda (2006:15, 2010:8) and Zambia
(2006:3, 2010:1).
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Initial GDP (in 2006) and initial GDP squared, the growth rate of GDP per capita, trade
openness (imports plus exports in GDP), and official development assistance (ODA) in GDP
describe the level of economic development. As measure of institutional quality we use the
World Bank’s rule of law index for its focus on contract enforcement and property rights, which
we assume to be particularly relevant for establishing and maintaining business relations.
A high share of resource rents in GDP is expected to reduce the probability of FT certi-
fication and the number of FTPOs due to employment opportunities related to this (rural)
non-farm sector. Finally, given the religious origins of the very early FT movement and anec-
dotal evidence telling that Christian organizations promote the idea of FT, assist smallholders
in the certification process and help to establish contact to Northern customers, we assume
that predominantly catholic countries have a higher probability and number of FTPOs. For
descriptive statistics, and a detailed description of the data and its sources, see Tables A2 and
A4 in the Appendix.
We are able to cover 118 out of 143 eligible low- and middle-income countries, resulting
in 586 country-year observations. The sample consists of 309 observations (52 percent) with
a zero and 277 with a positive count and covers 62 out of 63 countries with FT certified
producers (only Timor-Leste is missing). The broad country coverage should allow us to draw
a valid picture of the determinants of the extensive and intensive margins of FT certification.
3.3 Estimation Results
Table 1 shows the results for the negative binomial estimation of the outcome (count) and
the probit estimation of the participation equation. The coefficient estimates of the former
represent the average marginal change in the log count of FTPOs, and the average marginal
effect of the probability of belonging to the always zero group for the latter. Columns (1) and
(2) report the estimation results of the full sample, Columns (3) and (4) exclude the years
2008 and 2009 to judge the impact of the imputation of the missing FTPO data.
For the probit estimation in Column (2), the probability of belonging to the always zero
group significantly decreases when a country is predominantly catholic and increases with
the share of arable land in total land area. Initial income exhibits an U-shaped relationship
suggesting that lower middle income countries have the highest probability of FT certifica-
tion. For the sample excluding the years 2008 and 2009 (Column (4)) we find a similar
pattern, but now resource rents significantly increase and country size (population) decreases
the probability of zero FTPOs and the quadratic GDP term turned insignificant.
In the outcome equation in Columns (1) and (3) the log FTPO count significantly increases
with rural population density, the share of arable land in total land area and country size. As
for the participation decision, we observe a significant inverse U-shaped effect of initial GDP.
In contrast to the full sample, resource rents have a significantly positive impact on the log
count when we exclude the years 2008 and 2009.
For both samples we find a significant dispersion parameter α indicating that the condi-
tional mean and variance differ significantly, thus rejecting a Poisson distribution. The Voung
test (not reported in Table 1) confirms that a proportion of zeros is inflated by an additional
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mechanism and suggests that the ZINB model is the most efficient choice.
Table 1: ZINB: Determinants of FT extent and intensity
Full sample Excluding outliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Neg.Bin Probit Neg.Bin Probit Neg.Bin Probit Neg.Bin Probit
log(rur. pop. den)t−1 0.2967* 0.1101 0.3395*** 0.0586 0.3306*** 0.0472 0.2655** 0.0369
(0.1562) (0.0950) (0.1282) (0.0498) (0.1119) (0.0307) (0.1162) (0.0333)
GDP growth p.c.t−1 0.5102 0.2028 -0.7442 -0.0898 -0.8219 0.1558 0.9128 -0.1328
(1.9785) (0.3905) (2.9838) (0.4967) (1.5239) (0.2598) (2.6924) (0.4642)
log(ODA/GDP)t−1 0.2682 0.0096 0.2866 0.0179 0.3272** 0.0405 0.2629 0.0502
(0.1963) (0.0321) (0.1880) (0.0485) (0.1624) (0.0402) (0.1666) (0.0488)
log(Trade/GDP)t−1 0.1732 -0.0611 0.0764 -0.0609 0.0903 -0.0364 0.1058 -0.0733
(0.3211) (0.0543) (0.3096) (0.0415) (0.2737) (0.0771) (0.2962) (0.0688)
Catholic -0.3672 -0.4131** -0.3567 -0.5030** -0.2894 -0.2661*** -0.1419 -0.3398**
(0.3311) (0.2008) (0.3421) (0.2277) (0.2872) (0.0636) (0.3327) (0.1458)
log(Res. r./GDP)t−1 0.2021 0.2660 0.3382* 0.2760*** 0.5106*** 0.2556*** 0.4754*** 0.2757***
(0.1721) (0.2066) (0.1916) (0.0650) (0.1252) (0.0393) (0.1373) (0.0365)
Rule of Law 0.1268 -0.2096 0.1476 -0.1139 0.2701 -0.1008** 0.2617 -0.1390**
(0.2214) (0.1302) (0.2091) (0.0964) (0.2278) (0.0459) (0.2101) (0.0666)
log(Arable land) 0.2887** 0.0622** 0.2753** 0.0739** 0.4636*** 0.0819*** 0.4295*** 0.0796**
(0.1283) (0.0248) (0.1235) (0.0356) (0.1150) (0.0302) (0.1208) (0.0327)
log(Pop.) 0.8374*** -0.1023 0.6986*** -0.1225*** 0.4626*** -0.1429*** 0.4893*** -0.1456***
(0.1733) (0.1054) (0.1292) (0.0456) (0.0978) (0.0206) (0.1154) (0.0260)
log(GDP p.c. 2006) 5.9691*** -1.2036** 5.7983*** -0.5753 3.9699*** -0.6948** 4.4816*** -0.6883**
(1.1477) (0.5395) (1.1485) (0.4392) (1.0202) (0.3003) (1.0690) (0.3260)
log(GDP p.c. 2006)2 -0.3921*** 0.1052** -0.3763*** 0.0565* -0.2571*** 0.0670*** -0.2985*** 0.0677***
(0.0874) (0.0518) (0.0813) (0.0318) (0.0716) (0.0205) (0.0767) (0.0216)
Overdispersion α -1.0299*** -0.8831*** -1.3284*** -1.1564***
(0.2901) (0.2674) (0.2829) (0.2765)
Pseudo Log L. -930.420 -577.842 -795.694 -486.118
AIC 1950.840 1233.683 1686.071 1052.235
N 586 351 556 339
N zero 309 182 309 182
1 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; robust standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level. Coefficients represent average
marginal effects on the probability of a zero-count (selection equation) and the log count of FTPOs (outcome equation). N zero refers to
the number of observations with a zero count in the selection equation.
2 All regressions include dummies for Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, South East Asia, Pacific, Latin
America and the Caribbean and year dummies.
Table 2 compares the actual data and the predicted probability and the predicted FTPO
count based on the estimation in Columns (1) and (2). The predicted probability of a zero
FTPO count is 49 percent, slightly below to the actual probability of 52 percent, and the
difference between the actual and the predicted count is smaller than 1. Figure 1 displays
these deviations, where for countries below the zero line the predicted count exceeds the actual
number of FTPOs, and vice versa for countries above the zero line. On the left side of Figure
1 we find, e.g. Nigeria, which is an example of how the ZINB model distinguishes between
the two data generating processes: although Nigeria does not have FTPOs, the probit model
predicts a positive probability, i.e. Nigeria is a “wrong zero” and - given the explanatory
variables - we would expect to observe around 10 FTPOs.
In general, our specification predicts the count outcome well for low numbers of FTPOs.
However, the deviations increase if the average number of FTPOs surpasses 39, despite ac-
counting for heteroskedasticity by clustering the standard errors at the country level. As these
large deviations occur although the predicted values are based on a broad set of economic,
historic, cultural and geographical characteristics, we classify countries with an average FTPO
count larger than 39 as outliers and exclude them subsequently from our regressions.
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Table 2: Summary ZINB
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Probit Model Full sample
Actual Probability 0.527 0.499 0 1
Predicted Probability 0.491 0.415 0 1
Correlation 0.842
Neg. Binomial Model Full sample
Actual Count 5.858 11.949 0 82
Predicted Count 6.549 14.282 0 110.92
Correlation 0.785
Neg. Binomial Model Positive counts
Actual Count 12.393 14.878 1 82
Predicted Count 13.162 18.481 0.020 110.92
Correlation 0.829
Figure 1: Actual vs. predicted FTPOs
Columns (5) to (8) in Table 1 replicate the regressions for both samples without the countries
identified as outliers in Figure 1. The results are in line with those obtained for the short
sample including the outlying observations, apart for the rule of law and initial GDP in the
participation decision. In Columns (6) and (8), the rule of law turned statistically significant
at the five percent level and suggest that an improvement in the rule of law reduces the
probability of zero FTPOs. For the short sample without the years 2008 and 2009 (Column
(8)) we can confirm the U-shaped effect of initial GDP per capita. The turning point is
reached at a per capita income level of 162 USD (measured in constant 2000 USD), and only
a small number of countries in Africa, such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi or the Democratic
Republic of Congo are below or around this level. If income per capita in 2006 was higher,
the probability to observe a zero FTPO-count increases significantly.
The results for the count outcome in Columns (5) and (7) correspond those obtained for
the short sample in Column (3), suggesting that the exclusion of the six countries with an
unusually high FTPO count increases the consistency of our estimation. We find significantly
positive effects of rural population density, country size in terms of population and the share
of arable land in total land area, indicating that the log count of FTPOs is higher when the
agricultural sector is relatively labor intensive. In our preferred specification in Columns (6)
and (7), the log count rises by 0.33 percent for a one-unit increase in rural population density,
and by 0.46 percent for a one-unit increase in the log of population. Following Dorward et al.
(2004), high population density is also associated with lower per-unit costs in infrastructure
development, service provision and trade, enhancing the intensification of farming systems.
Many problems of agricultural development in more marginal areas are outside the agricultural
sector, e.g. a lack of roads and telecommunications infrastructure. Higher rural population
density thus proxies labor-intensive farming, better infrastructure and network effects across
communities that cause an increase in the number of FTPOs.
3.4 Robustness
Removing potentially influential observations has shown that our specification of the ZINB
model fits the data very well, and it is robust to the imputation of the missing FTPO data.
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We thus choose the sample of Columns (6) and (7) in Table 1 to test the robustness of our
hypothesis. The first two columns in Table 3 replicate Columns (6) and (7) of Table 1,
then we subsequently add variables that are suspected to influence our hypothesis. We first
concentrate on the participation equation before we turn to the outcome equation.
Columns (4) and (6) test the hypothesis that catholic organizations promoted FT. We
control for Spanish colonial history, as the largest number of FTPOs can be found in Latin
America, and it might be the case that the catholic dummy does not capture the effect of
being catholic, but of Spanish colonial roots. Similarly, we ask whether the effect of being
predominantly catholic persists in an ethnically (religiously) fragmented environment. We find
that former Spanish colonies are 29 percentage points more likely to have FTPOs, while ethnic
fractionalization does not have a significant impact. The catholic dummy is not sensitive to
the inclusion of additional control variables and remains significantly negative, i.e. catholic
countries are on average up to 36 percentage points more likely to have FTPOs.
Following Collier and Hoeffler (1998) or Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2011), natural resource
rents positively correlate with political instability and authoritarian regimes, thus the negative
effect on FTPO in the selection equation might not be attributed to natural resources, but
instead stem from political factors. Columns (8) and (10) therefore include the cumulative
number of coups d’etat and revolutions since the 1940s and the Freedom House classification
of political freedom (1 indicates a free and 3 a not free system). Neither for the number
of coups d’etat and revolutions, nor for political freedom we find any significant impact on
the probability of observe FTPOs, and also the coefficient estimate of resource rents remains
almost unchanged. However, due to collinearity among measures of institutional quality, the
rule of law turns insignificant when we control for political freedom.
The specification in Column (12) contains all additional control variables. Spanish colonial
history remains significant, while the other regressors are not significantly different from zero,
and also the quadratic initial income term turned insignificant. For all robustness checks of
the participation equation the results show a significant impact of rural population density,
i.e. the probability of zero FTPOs increases with the labor intensity of the agricultural sector.
In the outcome equation none of the additional explanatory variables is significantly dif-
ferent from zero, and they also do not have any impact on the other explanatory variables.
Apart from Column (7), the estimation results provide evidence for a significantly positive
effect of official development assistance (ODA) in GDP. As argued by Bacon et al. (2008),
Valkila (2009) or Wilson (2010), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important
role in assisting smallholders in the certification process. The application for FT certification
itself is rather complex and costly and often requires assistance to apply successfully.13
The coefficients of the quadratic initial GDP term are significantly different from zero in
every specification and support the inverted U-shaped impact on the log FTPO count. Up
13Of course, official development assistance is not equivalent to the assistance given by NGOs, but the lack of
data on the number of NGOs per country and year constrains us to the use of the share of ODA in GDP.
Since Dreher et al. (2009) have shown that the location choices of NGOs positively correlate with those of
official backdonors rather than complementing it, we are confident that the share of ODA in GDP relates
sufficiently well to the number of NGOs within a country.
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to a certain point, the number of FTPOs increases with income since successful certification
requires the payment of a fee (minimum 3,000 Euro). Depending on the set of regressors, the
turning point at which the positive effect of initial GDP turns zero is at a per capita income
level of around 2,600 US Dollar (measured in constant 2000 US Dollar). Countries exceeding
this level of initial income have on average a smaller share of agriculture in GDP (5 vs. 21
percent) and a lower number of FTPOs (2.4 vs. 3.2).
Overall, following picture emerges from the ZINB model: FT certification is more likely in
large, resource poor, catholic countries with a relatively capital intensive agricultural sector,
a strong rule of law and Spanish colonial history. The coefficients of the quadratic initial
income term, together with the positive effect of rural population density and the rule of law,
suggest that lower-middle income countries have the highest probability of non-zero FTPOs.
Given a positive probability of certification, the largest number of FT certified producers
can be found in large lower-middle income countries with a labor intensive agricultural sector.
The share of official development assistance in GDP has a positive impact on the FT intensity,
while Spanish colonial history, ethnic homogeneity, political stability and democracy play a
minor role. The relationship between initial income and the number of FTPOs points to a
problem inherent to the FT concept and reflects that the costs of certification may constitute
a major entry barrier for smallholders from the poorest countries.
4 Growth Effects of Fair Trade
4.1 Empirical Model & Data
The literature review conveyed that the major global Fair Trade organizations consider FT as
a specific type of development assistance, where consumers are willing to pay a higher price
in order to provide the producer a “fair” price, a price premium, stable market links and
cooperative services.
We thus set up a model related to the aid-growth framework established by Collier and
Dollar (2002), Hansen and Tarp (2001) or Dalgaard et al. (2004) but use agricultural growth
as dependent variable (Christiaensen et al., 2011) to answer the question whether the number
of FTPOs has any significant impact on the growth rate of income in the agricultural sector.
We specify a growth equation that tests the causal relationship between agricultural growth
and the intensity of FT certification,
yai,t = FTPOi,t−1β + x′i,tγ + z′i,t−1δ + ηr + ξt + εi,t. (4)
Agricultural GDP growth per capita yai,t is assumed to depend on the number of FT certified
producer organizations lagged one year and the explanatory variables from the ZINB model
in order to isolate the exogenous component of the FTPO count. The quadratic initial income
term is replaced with initial income per capita in agriculture.
As the average FTPO comprises 300 members, we have to account for the fact that, e.g.,
ten average size cooperatives have a different impact on the agricultural sector in Guatemala
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than in Brazil. To establish a cross-country comparison we generate a country-specific measure
of FT intensity by taking the log of the number of FTPOs plus one divided by the rural
population. Of course, our measure of FT intensity is only a crude proxy of the size of the FT
sector in terms of export share or employment, but it is the only data available on a country
level.
It has been argued that farmers supplying FT markets benefit via the price and the
cooperative channel. We expect both channels to increase income in the agricultural sector,
and especially for the cooperative channel it is reasonable to assume that the impact arises
only with a time lag. If we observe a positive effect of a country’s FT intensity on yai,t, it
is plausible to assume that FT helps to reduce (rural) poverty. Positive effects on poverty
are expected to arise via and increase with the share of rural population participating in
FT, access to new export markets, and spill-over effects from agricultural to non-agricultural
growth (World Bank, 2008; Christiaensen et al., 2011). However, if the critics of the FT
system are right we should see β < 0 and FT certification will increase poverty by reducing
agricultural growth.
We estimate Equation (4) using four different estimation methods, with OLS serving as the
benchmark. A two-way error component model (FE) allows to address a possible correlation of
country- and year-specific effects and the explanatory variables. Furthermore we use Arellano
and Bond (1991) difference GMM and Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimators,
taking lagged levels and lagged levels and differences, respectively, as instruments to account
for endogeneity arising from serial correlation and unobservable heterogeneity. The difference
GMM estimator suffers from weak instruments in small samples if the lagged levels are only
weakly correlated with the differenced regressors, while the system GMM estimator can be
biased if they are correlated with the country fixed effects (Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009).
For the GMM estimation we treat lagged FTPO, rural population density, official devel-
opment assistance, trade openness and resource rents as predetermined variables, while we
assume the share of arable land in total land area, the log of population, the rule of law and
the catholic dummy to be exogenous. These variables together with the landlocked dummy
serve as exogenous variables and overidentfying restrictions and allow to test the exogeneity
of the instruments. All regressions include year dummies to capture period-specific shocks
and a set of regional dummies to account for characteristics common to all countries within
one particular region.
The sample covers (up to) 95 of 143 eligible producer countries (see table A1 in the
Appendix), where 49 countries (51 percent) have FTPOs. Kenya, South Africa, Peru, Chile,
Mexico and India were excluded due to the unusually large number of FTPOs. Table A3 in
the Appendix shows the descriptive statistics for this sample of up to 357 observations.
As it is a priori not clear how the number of FTPOs it related to agricultural growth,
we estimate four different specifications of the growth regression that are aligned to the aid-
growth literature. More precisely we follow Clemens et al. (2011) and include i) current
FTPO, ii) lagged FTPO, and iii, iv) a (current/lagged) quadratic FTPO term to account for
possible nonlinear returns.
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4.2 Estimation Results
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 3 report the results from OLS estimation of the four different
specifications of equation (4). For every specification we observe a positive effect of current
(lagged) FTPO on agricultural growth that turns statistically significant at the 10 percent
(5 percent) level when we include the quadratic FTPO term, which is significant itself. This
result is largely in line with findings from the aid-growth literature, where Clemens et al. (2011)
find positive but insignificant impact of current and lagged aid on growth but a significant
non-linear effect for current and lagged aid. The application of an aid-growth framework on
the impact of FT certification on (agricultural) growth thus turns out as a feasible approach.
Given that the size of the coefficients remains relatively stable across specifications (1)
to (4), and using Akaike Information Criterion as a model selection criterion, we choose
the lagged quadratic specification in Column (4) as our preferred model. The empirical
finding of increasing marginal returns to FT is plausible in the sense that if it is possible to
establish comprehensive participation of smallholders experiencing benefits via the FT price
and cooperative channels, we observe a significant and quantitatively larger effect compared to
a situation where only few participate. Support in fields as product quality, technical training,
women’s participation or educational programs are likely to show positive effects only with
a time lag and when conducted on a large scale. Together, we allege, these factors lead to a
more than proportional increase in the growth rate of agricultural GDP per capita.
In Columns (5) to (8) we estimate our preferred specification using four different estima-
tion methods. We first run OLS on the cross-section, then we account for country-specific
unobserved heterogeneity using a two-way fixed effects model, and Arellano and Bond (1991)
difference and Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM estimation. The results for the cross-
section and Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimation closely resemble the baseline OLS
estimation, while removing the country-specific heterogeneity in the two-way fixed effects and
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimation renders all explanatory variables insignificant.
As a Hausman test discards the two-way fixed effects model in favor of the random effects
model (identical to OLS on the pooled cross-section with standard errors clustered at the
country level), we choose Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM estimation as our preferred method
as it removes both sources of endogeneity and neither of the test statistics leads us to reject
the assumption of consistency of the estimator. For the regression in Column (8) we find that
the quadratic FTPO term is separately and jointly significantly different from zero at the
5 percent level. One additional average-size FTPO relative to a country’s rural population
increases agricultural growth per capita by 0.0013 percentage points or 0.0018 percentage
points for a one standard deviation increase in the FT intensity. The coefficient estimate is
quantitatively small, but given the marginal share of FT in total agricultural production, it
is surprising to observe significant growth effects at all. Figure 2 displays the marginal effect
of FT intensity on agricultural growth. As it is measured in logs, the marginal effect of an
additional FTPO in the rural population declines, but at a slower and slower rate.
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Table 4: Growth regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS CS1 FE AB BB
log(Rur. pop. den.)t−1 0.0010 -0.0004 0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0022 0.0828 0.0828 0.0002
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0953) (0.0930) (0.0043)
ODA (GDP)t−1 0.0767** 0.0786** 0.0756** 0.0773** 0.0690*** -0.0199 -0.0199 0.0642**
(0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0320) (0.0324) (0.0254) (0.0541) (0.0529) (0.0311)
Tradet−1 0.0167 0.0194 0.0171 0.0206 0.0167* 0.0301 0.0301 0.0212
(0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0176) (0.0093) (0.0771) (0.0753) (0.0176)
Resource rentst−1 0.0470 0.0495 0.0477 0.0515 0.0746* 0.1245 0.1245 0.0575*
(0.0370) (0.0355) (0.0367) (0.0351) (0.0414) (0.0936) (0.0913) (0.0320)
Catholic 0.0017 -0.0051 0.0001 -0.0079 -0.0119 -0.0103
(0.0198) (0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0214) (0.0143) (0.0209)
Rule of Law 0.0079 0.0067 0.0078 0.0064 0.0004 -0.0159 -0.0159 0.0055
(0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0422) (0.0411) (0.0091)
Arab. land 0.0985* 0.0898* 0.1003* 0.0925* 0.0262 1.2170 1.2170 0.0971*
(0.0533) (0.0525) (0.0537) (0.0526) (0.0335) (0.9103) (0.8902) (0.0502)
log(Pop.) 0.0105* 0.0123** 0.0117** 0.0139** 0.0127*** 0.0663 0.0662 0.0149**
(0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0038) (0.5526) (0.5387) (0.0061)
log(agri. GDP p.c. 2006) -0.0080 -0.0114 -0.0084 -0.0125 -0.0033 -0.0135
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0084) (0.0117)
FTPO 0.0088 0.0709* 0.0714**
(0.0070) (0.0367) (0.0290)
FTPO2 0.0021* 0.0021**
(0.0011) (0.0009)
FTPOt−1 0.0104 0.0820** 0.3781 0.3784 0.0884**
(0.0070) (0.0358) (0.2547) (0.2354) (0.0362)
FTPO2t−1 0.0024** 0.0110 0.0110 0.0025**
(0.0011) (0.0077) (0.0070) (0.0011)
N 357 357 357 357 97 357 263 357
No. of Instruments 12 23
AIC -634.22 -634.16 -634.65 -635.24 -358.70 -750.51
Notes: CS: Cross section; FE: Two-way fixed effects; AB: Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM; BB: Blundell and Bond (1998) GMM.
Growth rates expressed in logs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Robust standard errors clustered
at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include dummies for Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South
Asia, South East Asia, Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and year dummies. AB and BB uses orthogonal deviations to
maximize the number of observations in a panel with gaps.
1 For simplicity, we report the explanatory variables for the cross section under the lagged label.
Figure 2: Marginal Effect FTPO
In contrast to many studies on official development assistance and economic growth, we find
that the share of ODA in GDP significantly increases agricultural growth, although agriculture
has been neglected by donors and developing countries’ governments in the past decades
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(Bezemer and Headey, 2008).14 It cannot be ruled out that the aid-growth literature could
find more robust results if it focusses on the agricultural sector instead of economy-wide
growth when analyzing the effectiveness of aid, since most aid recipient countries strongly
rely on agriculture and most of the poor live in rural areas. If the share of agriculture in
total value added is small and given the time lag of spillover effects to other sectors, an (aid-
induced) increase in agricultural growth must not necessarily show up as a significant increase
in economy-wide growth (Christiaensen et al., 2011). Moreover, to find significant effects of
both, FT and ODA, suggests that they target distinct fields of economic activity. Finally, we
find a small positive effect of arable area in total land area and population size. This, however,
may be be interpreted as a convergence effect in the sense that a large share of arable area in
total land area corresponds to labor-intensive and thus a less developed agricultural sector.
4.3 Robustness Checks
Table 4 displays robustness checks of the lagged quadratic specification using Blundell and
Bond (1998) GMM estimation. Column (1) replicates the baseline result from Column (8)
in Table 3 and then we gradually include the additional control variables from the ZINB
specification to see whether the effect of FT on agricultural growth is sensitive to character-
istics of institutional quality. Finally, Columns (6) to (8) show the estimation results for the
subsamples of low, lower middle and upper middle income countries.15,16
The estimation results throughout show a significantly positive impact of the quadratic
FTPO term on agricultural growth. The coefficient estimates are not sensitive to any of the
additional control variables, suggesting that our FT measure does not capture growth effects
that are actually related to institutional quality, cultural characteristics or political stability.
For the three subsamples we find positive estimates for the quadratic FTPO term, which
turns significantly positive at the 1 percent level for the group of upper middle income countries
(Column (8)). Compared to the baseline specification reported in Column (1), the coefficient
estimates increase almost threefold in magnitude, such that agricultural growth increases by
0.00043 percentage points for an additional FTPO. Conditional on participation in FT, upper
middle income countries have the largest number of FTPOs (13.5 for upper middle, 10.55 for
lower middle, and 6.84 for low income countries), and FT intensity also has the largest effect
on agricultural growth in the most developed countries in the sample. This result implies that
the FT strategy indeed constitutes a viable development strategy, but those countries that
are actually in the focus of the FLO concept are not the ones who benefit significantly, but
instead smallholders in the most developed eligible countries.
14Bezemer and Headey (2008) summarize that the real global volume of assistance to agriculture decreased
from US $6.2 in 1980 to US $2.3 billion in 2002 or from US $20 per capita to US $7 in 2001. This corresponds
to a decline of agriculture’s share in total aid from 17 to 3.7 percent. With the introduction of the Millenium
Development Goals and their focus on social indicators, aid allocation shifted to social sectors in general.
15The FLO (2011) classifies countries with gross national income (GNI) per capita below US $875 as low
income countries, with US $876-$3,456 as lower middle income, and $3,455 - $10,725 as upper middle income
countries. However, there geographical scope of the FLO also comprises countries with income per capita
exceeding the maximum of US $10,725. For consistency, we follow the definition of the FLO (2011).
16As a further robustness check we run all growth regressions including the six countries discarded as outliers
from the ZINB model without observing significant changes in the estimation results.
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One possible explanation for this finding relates to Engel’s law and the income elasticity of
demand for agricultural products. As (Northern consumers) incomes rise, the growth in the
intake of food and drinks will sooner or later stagnate, but not necessarily the expenditures,
as demand for high value agricultural products is not income inelastic. Demand for high
value agricultural goods as speciality coffee or exotic (organic) fruits depends on consumers’
motivational forces as the consistency of self-image or the need for high self-esteem, and can
trigger substantial consumer expenditures in high income countries. If trading opportunities
for high value food exist, its production can provide some countries with important growth
opportunities (Christiaensen et al., 2011; Witt, 2011).
Given that the ZINB model suggests that the probability of FT certification increases with
the rule of law and up to a certain point also with income, it does not come as a surprise to see
that upper middle income countries benefit most from this additional demand. The estimation
results show that the specialization in the production of high value agricultural products such
as coffee, bananas or cocoa, in combination with a marketing strategy that connects Northern
consumers to the producers in the South can cause a significant increase in income. However,
this is only the case when the production structures are already relatively well developed, but
it seems to be less effective for building up (agricultural) production structures from scratch.
As agriculture is significantly more effective in poverty reduction among the poorest due to
larger participation of poorer households in agriculture (Christiaensen et al., 2011), we assume
a FT induced increase in agricultural growth to show only a small contribution to poverty
reduction. This result indicates that the FT concept misses to target people below the 2$-
a-day poverty line, but instead generates income opportunities for smallholders in countries
that already moved on from primarily agricultural production structures.
Nevertheless, the results of the empirical analysis need to be interpreted with care. Firstly,
the measure of FT intensity is only a rough proxy of actual export or employment figures in
the tiny FT sector, and moreover it covers only a short time horizon. Secondly, although we
observe positive effects of FTPO on agricultural growth throughout, significant effects can
be found only if we allow for nonlinear marginal returns. Thirdly, the results seem to be
driven by upper-middle income countries where the share of agriculture in GDP is relatively
small. Given these weaknesses we do not want to overemphasize the estimation results.
However, what can be confirmed is that there is no empirical evidence that participation in
FT networks is harmful to agricultural growth. And as (ethical) consumers experience utility
from the consumption of FT certified products, and smallholders and hired labor seem to
experience an increase in income, the FT concept indeed constitutes an alternative way of
outside assistance.
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Table 5: Growth Regressions: Robustness tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FTPOt−1 0.0859** 0.0921** 0.0861** 0.0839** 0.0873** 0.1813 0.0316 0.2217***
(0.0368) (0.0363) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0354) (0.1448) (0.0407) (0.0725)
FTPO2t−1 0.0025** 0.0027** 0.0025** 0.0024** 0.0025** 0.0059 0.0010 0.0068***
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0049) (0.0013) (0.0023)
log(rur. pop. den.)t−1 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0157 0.0036 0.0039
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0189) (0.0096) (0.0069)
ODA (GDP)t−1 0.0666** 0.0636** 0.0653** 0.0682** 0.0679** 0.0288 0.0989 -0.5641
(0.0299) (0.0316) (0.0311) (0.0320) (0.0305) (0.0420) (0.1104) (0.7192)
Tradet−1 0.0202 0.0200 0.0190 0.0184 0.0219 0.0731* 0.0053 0.0057
(0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0399) (0.0207) (0.0331)
Resource rentt−1 0.0639* 0.0661* 0.0627* 0.0639** 0.0706** 0.0516 0.1067*** 0.0142
(0.0327) (0.0341) (0.0329) (0.0323) (0.0341) (0.0592) (0.0372) (0.0459)
Catholic -0.0107 -0.0110 -0.0093 -0.0113 -0.0121 0.0021 0.0248 -0.0291
(0.0210) (0.0202) (0.0234) (0.0209) (0.0227) (0.0368) (0.0226) (0.0318)
Rule of Law 0.0043 0.0033 0.0060 0.0061 -0.0003 0.0760*** 0.0100 -0.0093
(0.0102) (0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0083) (0.0155) (0.0135) (0.0100)
Arab. land 0.1110** 0.0995** 0.1005* 0.0928* 0.1040* 0.0200 0.1635** 0.0685
(0.0503) (0.0508) (0.0520) (0.0539) (0.0547) (0.0714) (0.0645) (0.0774)
log(Pop.) 0.0150** 0.0152** 0.0150** 0.0151** 0.0162** 0.0056 0.0016 0.0225**
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0148) (0.0069) (0.0103)
log(agri. GDP p.c. 2006) -0.0123 -0.0121 -0.0119 -0.0129 -0.0134 0.0218 0.0090 -0.0527***
(0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0314) (0.0138) (0.0198)
No. of coups -0.0009 -0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Political freedom -0.0052 -0.0063
(0.0114) (0.0114)
Spanish Colony -0.0026 -0.0024
(0.0169) (0.0164)
Ethn. frac. -0.0141 -0.0197
(0.0240) (0.0245)
N 349 349 349 349 349 77 134 138
p-value (Hansen) 0.896 0.843 0.850 0.929 0.990 0.336 0.795 1.000
p-value AR(2) 0.555 0.551 0.552 0.550 0.551 0.209 0.837 0.685
No. of instruments 24 24 24 24 27 19 23 23
Notes: Growth rates expressed in logs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Robust standard errors clustered
at the country level in parentheses. All regressions include dummies for Sub Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia,
South East Asia, Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean and year dummies. Orthogonal deviations are used to maximize the number
of observations in a panel with gaps.
5 Conclusions
The present paper provides a framework for the first cross-country assessment of the deter-
minants of the extensive and intensive margins of FT certification, and analyzes the impact
of FT certification on growth in the agricultural sector and thus on poverty. We therefore
collected data on the number of producer organizations which obtained Fairtrade certification
for agricultural products from Fairtrade Labelling International (FLO) in the period 2006-
2010. This constitutes the first comprehensive data set that allows to compare Fairtrade
activities across countries and time at one glance. In the absence of data on export shares or
employment on a cross-country basis, we have to rely on this rather general measure in our
analysis.
A zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model allows to disentangle the probability of
FT certification (extensive margin) from the number of FTPOs (intensive margin). The
estimation results suggest that FT certification is more likely in large, resource poor, catholic
countries with Spanish colonial history and a low number of coups d’etat and revolutions.
The probability of certification increases further with country size in terms of population, the
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capital intensity of the agricultural sector and the rule of law. The coefficients of the quadratic
initial income term, together with the positive impact of rural population density (capital
intensity) and the rule of law, indicate that lower-middle income countries have the highest
probability of non-zero FTPOs. Given a non-zero predicted probability of FT certification,
the largest number of FTPOs can be found in large lower-middle income countries with a
labor intensive agricultural sector. The share of official development assistance in GDP has
a positive impact on the FT intensity and implies a certain degree of cooperation across
development institutions.
In order to obtain an estimate of the impact of FT certification on agricultural growth,
we specify a growth regression that includes a country-specific measure of the FT intensity
and the explanatory variables from the ZINB model. Estimation results provide empirical
evidence that the number of FTPOs relative to a country’s rural population has a positive
impact on agricultural growth that is statistically significant if we allow for nonlinear marginal
returns and a time lag.
The impact of FT on agricultural growth is largest in upper middle income countries, while
there are only little discernible links between FT and agricultural growth in lower middle and
low income countries. Cooperative membership and collective producer action cause positive
growth effects for countries in a rather advanced stage of development, while producers from
low and lower middle income countries can not (yet) reap the benefits. A possible explanation
may be found in the structure of demand for FT products, as the commodities demanded most
(coffee, bananas and cocoa) are largely produced by upper middle income countries. Further
research should thus focus on data disaggregated by product in order to see whether the
impact of FT differs across products.
Given the important role of agriculture in reducing poverty, FT certification seems to be
able to support poverty reduction via increasing growth in the agricultural sector, but in its
present construction it misses to reach the truly poor. The positive link between income and
the number of producer organizations suggests that the certification fee limits FT certification
of smallholders in lower middle and low income countries. This is a consequence from the very
conception of FT certification where smallholders face a costly certification process in order
to participate. The FLO is encouraged to address this entry barrier for poor smallholders
in order fulfil its mission of delivering sustainable livelihoods and development opportunities
to the poorest countries in the world, in particular since those are the ones who lack income
opportunities outside the agricultural sector.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data and Sources
Table A1: Geographical Scope of FT producer certification
Country ZINB Growth Country ZINB Growth Country ZINB Growth
Africa: 253 producer organizations
Algeria + (0) + Gabon + (0) + Niger + (0)
Angola (0) Gambia + (0) + Nigeria (0)
Benin + (2) Ghana + (14) Rwanda + (8)
Botswana + (0) + Guinea (0) St. Helena (0)
Burkina Faso (11) Guinea-Bissau (0) Sao Tome &
Principe
(1)
Burundi + (0) + Kenya + (54) + Senegal + (12) +
Cameroon + (3) + Lesotho + (0) + Seychelles (0)
Cape Verde + (0) + Liberia + (0) + Sierra Leone + (1)
Chad (0) Libyan Arab. Jam. (0) Somalia (0)
Central African
Rep.
+ (0) Madagascar + (8) + South Africa + (45) +
Comoros + (2) + Malawi + (8) + Sudan + (0) +
Congo + (0) Mali + (7) + Swaziland + (1) +
Congo, Dem. Rep. + (1) + Mauritania + (0) + Tanzania + (17) +
Cote d’Ivoire + (14) + Mauritius + (5) + Togo + (2) +
Egypt + (6) + Mayotte (0) Tunisia + (4) +
Equatorial Guinea + (0) + Morocco + (2) + Uganda + (8) +
Eritrea + (0) + Mozambique + (2) + Zambia + (1) +
Ethiopia + (6) + Namibia + (0) + Zimbabwe + (8) +
Americas: 509 producer organizations
Anguilla (0) Dominican Repub-
lic
+ (31) + Panama + (2) +
Antigua & Bar-
buda
+ (0) + Ecuador + (24) + Paraguay + (9) +
Argentina + (19) + El Salvador + (5) + Peru + (82) +
Barbados (0) Grenada + (0) + St. Kitts & Nevis (0)
Belize + (2) + Guatemala + (22) + St. Lucia + (1) +
Bolivia + (29) + Guyana + (0) + St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
(1)
Brazil + (35) + Haiti + (7) Suriname + (0) +
Chile + (23) + Honduras + (23) + Trinidad & Tobago + (0) +
Colombia + (77) + Jamaica + (0) + Turks & Caicos Is-
lands
(0)
Costa Rica + (13) + Mexico + (47) + Uruguay + (1) +
Cuba + (27) + Montserrat (0) Venezuela + (0) +
Dominica (0) Nicaragua + (29) +
Asia: 142 producer organizations
Afghanistan (0) Korea (North) (0) Philippines + (2) +
Armenia + (0) + Kazakhstan + (0) + Saudi Arabia + (0) +
Azerbaijan + (0) + Kyrgyzstan + (1) + Sri Lanka + (15) +
Bangladesh + (0) + Laos + (2) + Syrian Arab Re-
public
+ (0)
Bhutan + (0) + Lebanon + (0) + Tajikistan (0)
Cambodia + (0) + Malaysia + (0) + Thailand + (7) +
China + (7) + Maldives + (0) + Timor-Leste (0)
Georgia (0) Mongolia (0) Turkmenistan (0)
India + (61) + Myanmar (0) Uzbekistan + (0) +
Indonesia + (14) + Nepal + (0) + Viet Nam + (7) +
Iran + (0) + Occ. Palestinian
Terr.
(0) Yemen + (0) +
Iraq (0) Oman (0)
Jordan + (0) + Pakistan + (8) +
Oceania: 5 producer organization
Cook Islands (0) Niue (0) Tonga + (0) +
Fiji + (1) + Palau (0) Tokelau (0)
Kiribati + (0) + Papua New Guinea + (4) + Tuvalu (0)
Marshall Islands (0) Samoa + (0) Vanuatu + (0) +
Micronesia (0) Solomon Islands (0) Wallis & Futuna Is-
lands
(0)
Nauru 0) Tokelau (0)
A “+” indicates whether the particular country is included in the analysis, the number in parenthesis the number of Fair Trade certified
producer organizations in 2010.
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Table A2: Summary statistics: ZINB model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FTPO 3.576 6.411 0 35
GDP growth p.c. 0.031 0.05 -0.204 0.249
log(Rur. pop. den.) 5.812 1.142 2.27 9.326
log(ODA/GDP) -3.059 1.117 -5.383 0.362
log(Trade/GDP) -0.24 0.45 -1.334 0.985
log(Resource rents/GDP) -2.682 1.341 -4.605 0.73
log(Arable land/total land area) -2.624 1.295 -7.748 -0.498
log(Population) 15.606 1.947 11.124 21.014
log(GDP p.c. 2006) 7.041 1.193 4.551 9.483
Catholic 0.266 0.442 0 1
Rule of Law -0.51 0.674 -1.942 1.294
Spanish Colony 0.14 0.348 0 1
Ethnic fractionalization 0.49 0.258 0 0.930
No. of coups 2.719 4.883 0 20
Political freedom 2.027 0.762 1 3
Obs. 556
Table A3: Summary statistics: Growth regression
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Agri. GDP growth p.c. 0.006 0.096 -0.601 0.369
log((FTPO+1)/rur.pop) -13.957 1.862 -18.659 -9.753
log(Rur. pop. den.) 5.841 1.145 2.27 8.486
ODA/GDP 0.068 0.138 -0.005 1.437
Trade/GDP 0.914 0.418 0.263 2.678
Resource rents/GDP 0.114 0.16 0 0.879
Arable land/total land area 0.123 0.116 0.003 0.602
log(Population) 15.606 2.019 11.124 21.014
log(Agri. GDP p.c. 2006) 5.038 0.652 3.425 6.387
Catholic 0.297 0.458 0 1
Rule of Law -0.464 0.65 -1.835 1.294
Spanish Colony 0.16 0.367 0 1
Ethnic fractionalization 0.461 0.248 0 0.930
No. of coups 2.031 4.258 0 18
Political freedom 1.966 0.749 1 3
Obs. 357
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Table A4: Data Sources
Source Variable
FLO reports 2006, 2007, and 2010 FTPO (Fair Trade Producer Organization): Number of Fair Trade certified
producers. The number of producers for 2008 and 2009 was calculated based
on the country-specific growth rate.
World Bank World Development
Indicators 2012
Agricultural area (share of total land area)
Growth rate of agricultural GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD
Growth rate of GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD
GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD
Net official development assistance (ODA) received in constant 2010 USD as
a share of GDP in 2010 current USD.
Population
Rule of Law
Share of rural population of total population (in %); rural areas are defined
by national statistical offices.
Total natural resource rent as a share of GDP.
Penn World Tables 2012 Openness to trade at 2005 constant prices
Powell and Clayton (2011) (Cumulative) number of coups d’etat and revolutions
Norris (2009) Predominant catholic nation dummy, CIA factbook (updated and extended)
Regional dummies (Middle-East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia, East Asia, South East Asia, Pacific, Latin America)
Colonial roots
Landlocked dummy
Freedom House Political freedom: Composite measure of the political rights index and the
civil liberties index: 1 . . . free, 2 . . . partly free, 3 . . . unfree
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A.2 Fair trade prices
Figure A1: Fair Trade Price for Coffee
Source: FLO (2007b)
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